1/* 2 * Elliptic curve DSA 3 * 4 * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors 5 * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later 6 */ 7 8/* 9 * References: 10 * 11 * SEC1 https://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf 12 */ 13 14#include "common.h" 15 16#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) 17 18#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h" 19#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" 20 21#include <string.h> 22 23#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) 24#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h" 25#endif 26 27#include "mbedtls/platform.h" 28 29#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" 30#include "mbedtls/error.h" 31 32#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) 33 34/* 35 * Sub-context for ecdsa_verify() 36 */ 37struct mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ver { 38 mbedtls_mpi u1, u2; /* intermediate values */ 39 enum { /* what to do next? */ 40 ecdsa_ver_init = 0, /* getting started */ 41 ecdsa_ver_muladd, /* muladd step */ 42 } state; 43}; 44 45/* 46 * Init verify restart sub-context 47 */ 48static void ecdsa_restart_ver_init(mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ver_ctx *ctx) 49{ 50 mbedtls_mpi_init(&ctx->u1); 51 mbedtls_mpi_init(&ctx->u2); 52 ctx->state = ecdsa_ver_init; 53} 54 55/* 56 * Free the components of a verify restart sub-context 57 */ 58static void ecdsa_restart_ver_free(mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ver_ctx *ctx) 59{ 60 if (ctx == NULL) { 61 return; 62 } 63 64 mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->u1); 65 mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->u2); 66 67 ecdsa_restart_ver_init(ctx); 68} 69 70/* 71 * Sub-context for ecdsa_sign() 72 */ 73struct mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_sig { 74 int sign_tries; 75 int key_tries; 76 mbedtls_mpi k; /* per-signature random */ 77 mbedtls_mpi r; /* r value */ 78 enum { /* what to do next? */ 79 ecdsa_sig_init = 0, /* getting started */ 80 ecdsa_sig_mul, /* doing ecp_mul() */ 81 ecdsa_sig_modn, /* mod N computations */ 82 } state; 83}; 84 85/* 86 * Init verify sign sub-context 87 */ 88static void ecdsa_restart_sig_init(mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_sig_ctx *ctx) 89{ 90 ctx->sign_tries = 0; 91 ctx->key_tries = 0; 92 mbedtls_mpi_init(&ctx->k); 93 mbedtls_mpi_init(&ctx->r); 94 ctx->state = ecdsa_sig_init; 95} 96 97/* 98 * Free the components of a sign restart sub-context 99 */ 100static void ecdsa_restart_sig_free(mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_sig_ctx *ctx) 101{ 102 if (ctx == NULL) { 103 return; 104 } 105 106 mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->k); 107 mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->r); 108} 109 110#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) 111/* 112 * Sub-context for ecdsa_sign_det() 113 */ 114struct mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_det { 115 mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context rng_ctx; /* DRBG state */ 116 enum { /* what to do next? */ 117 ecdsa_det_init = 0, /* getting started */ 118 ecdsa_det_sign, /* make signature */ 119 } state; 120}; 121 122/* 123 * Init verify sign_det sub-context 124 */ 125static void ecdsa_restart_det_init(mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_det_ctx *ctx) 126{ 127 mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init(&ctx->rng_ctx); 128 ctx->state = ecdsa_det_init; 129} 130 131/* 132 * Free the components of a sign_det restart sub-context 133 */ 134static void ecdsa_restart_det_free(mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_det_ctx *ctx) 135{ 136 if (ctx == NULL) { 137 return; 138 } 139 140 mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free(&ctx->rng_ctx); 141 142 ecdsa_restart_det_init(ctx); 143} 144#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */ 145 146#define ECDSA_RS_ECP (rs_ctx == NULL ? NULL : &rs_ctx->ecp) 147 148/* Utility macro for checking and updating ops budget */ 149#define ECDSA_BUDGET(ops) \ 150 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_check_budget(grp, ECDSA_RS_ECP, ops)); 151 152/* Call this when entering a function that needs its own sub-context */ 153#define ECDSA_RS_ENTER(SUB) do { \ 154 /* reset ops count for this call if top-level */ \ 155 if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->ecp.depth++ == 0) \ 156 rs_ctx->ecp.ops_done = 0; \ 157 \ 158 /* set up our own sub-context if needed */ \ 159 if (mbedtls_ecp_restart_is_enabled() && \ 160 rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->SUB == NULL) \ 161 { \ 162 rs_ctx->SUB = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(*rs_ctx->SUB)); \ 163 if (rs_ctx->SUB == NULL) \ 164 return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED; \ 165 \ 166 ecdsa_restart_## SUB ##_init(rs_ctx->SUB); \ 167 } \ 168} while (0) 169 170/* Call this when leaving a function that needs its own sub-context */ 171#define ECDSA_RS_LEAVE(SUB) do { \ 172 /* clear our sub-context when not in progress (done or error) */ \ 173 if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->SUB != NULL && \ 174 ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) \ 175 { \ 176 ecdsa_restart_## SUB ##_free(rs_ctx->SUB); \ 177 mbedtls_free(rs_ctx->SUB); \ 178 rs_ctx->SUB = NULL; \ 179 } \ 180 \ 181 if (rs_ctx != NULL) \ 182 rs_ctx->ecp.depth--; \ 183} while (0) 184 185#else /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ 186 187#define ECDSA_RS_ECP NULL 188 189#define ECDSA_BUDGET(ops) /* no-op; for compatibility */ 190 191#define ECDSA_RS_ENTER(SUB) (void) rs_ctx 192#define ECDSA_RS_LEAVE(SUB) (void) rs_ctx 193 194#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ 195 196#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) || \ 197 !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT) || \ 198 !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT) 199/* 200 * Derive a suitable integer for group grp from a buffer of length len 201 * SEC1 4.1.3 step 5 aka SEC1 4.1.4 step 3 202 */ 203static int derive_mpi(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *x, 204 const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen) 205{ 206 int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; 207 size_t n_size = (grp->nbits + 7) / 8; 208 size_t use_size = blen > n_size ? n_size : blen; 209 210 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(x, buf, use_size)); 211 if (use_size * 8 > grp->nbits) { 212 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(x, use_size * 8 - grp->nbits)); 213 } 214 215 /* While at it, reduce modulo N */ 216 if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(x, &grp->N) >= 0) { 217 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(x, x, &grp->N)); 218 } 219 220cleanup: 221 return ret; 222} 223#endif /* ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC || !ECDSA_SIGN_ALT || !ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT */ 224 225int mbedtls_ecdsa_can_do(mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid) 226{ 227 switch (gid) { 228#ifdef MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED 229 case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519: return 0; 230#endif 231#ifdef MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED 232 case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448: return 0; 233#endif 234 default: return 1; 235 } 236} 237 238#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT) 239/* 240 * Compute ECDSA signature of a hashed message (SEC1 4.1.3) 241 * Obviously, compared to SEC1 4.1.3, we skip step 4 (hash message) 242 */ 243int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_restartable(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, 244 mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s, 245 const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, 246 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, 247 int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), 248 void *p_rng_blind, 249 mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx) 250{ 251 int ret, key_tries, sign_tries; 252 int *p_sign_tries = &sign_tries, *p_key_tries = &key_tries; 253 mbedtls_ecp_point R; 254 mbedtls_mpi k, e, t; 255 mbedtls_mpi *pk = &k, *pr = r; 256 257 /* Fail cleanly on curves such as Curve25519 that can't be used for ECDSA */ 258 if (!mbedtls_ecdsa_can_do(grp->id) || grp->N.p == NULL) { 259 return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; 260 } 261 262 /* Make sure d is in range 1..n-1 */ 263 if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(d, 1) < 0 || mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(d, &grp->N) >= 0) { 264 return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY; 265 } 266 267 mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&R); 268 mbedtls_mpi_init(&k); mbedtls_mpi_init(&e); mbedtls_mpi_init(&t); 269 270 ECDSA_RS_ENTER(sig); 271 272#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) 273 if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->sig != NULL) { 274 /* redirect to our context */ 275 p_sign_tries = &rs_ctx->sig->sign_tries; 276 p_key_tries = &rs_ctx->sig->key_tries; 277 pk = &rs_ctx->sig->k; 278 pr = &rs_ctx->sig->r; 279 280 /* jump to current step */ 281 if (rs_ctx->sig->state == ecdsa_sig_mul) { 282 goto mul; 283 } 284 if (rs_ctx->sig->state == ecdsa_sig_modn) { 285 goto modn; 286 } 287 } 288#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ 289 290 *p_sign_tries = 0; 291 do { 292 if ((*p_sign_tries)++ > 10) { 293 ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED; 294 goto cleanup; 295 } 296 297 /* 298 * Steps 1-3: generate a suitable ephemeral keypair 299 * and set r = xR mod n 300 */ 301 *p_key_tries = 0; 302 do { 303 if ((*p_key_tries)++ > 10) { 304 ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED; 305 goto cleanup; 306 } 307 308 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey(grp, pk, f_rng, p_rng)); 309 310#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) 311 if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->sig != NULL) { 312 rs_ctx->sig->state = ecdsa_sig_mul; 313 } 314 315mul: 316#endif 317 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable(grp, &R, pk, &grp->G, 318 f_rng_blind, 319 p_rng_blind, 320 ECDSA_RS_ECP)); 321 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(pr, &R.X, &grp->N)); 322 } while (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(pr, 0) == 0); 323 324#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) 325 if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->sig != NULL) { 326 rs_ctx->sig->state = ecdsa_sig_modn; 327 } 328 329modn: 330#endif 331 /* 332 * Accounting for everything up to the end of the loop 333 * (step 6, but checking now avoids saving e and t) 334 */ 335 ECDSA_BUDGET(MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_INV + 4); 336 337 /* 338 * Step 5: derive MPI from hashed message 339 */ 340 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(derive_mpi(grp, &e, buf, blen)); 341 342 /* 343 * Generate a random value to blind inv_mod in next step, 344 * avoiding a potential timing leak. 345 */ 346 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey(grp, &t, f_rng_blind, 347 p_rng_blind)); 348 349 /* 350 * Step 6: compute s = (e + r * d) / k = t (e + rd) / (kt) mod n 351 */ 352 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(s, pr, d)); 353 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&e, &e, s)); 354 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&e, &e, &t)); 355 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(pk, pk, &t)); 356 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(pk, pk, &grp->N)); 357 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod(s, pk, &grp->N)); 358 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(s, s, &e)); 359 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(s, s, &grp->N)); 360 } while (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(s, 0) == 0); 361 362#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) 363 if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->sig != NULL) { 364 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(r, pr)); 365 } 366#endif 367 368cleanup: 369 mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&R); 370 mbedtls_mpi_free(&k); mbedtls_mpi_free(&e); mbedtls_mpi_free(&t); 371 372 ECDSA_RS_LEAVE(sig); 373 374 return ret; 375} 376 377/* 378 * Compute ECDSA signature of a hashed message 379 */ 380int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s, 381 const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, 382 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) 383{ 384 /* Use the same RNG for both blinding and ephemeral key generation */ 385 return mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_restartable(grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, 386 f_rng, p_rng, f_rng, p_rng, NULL); 387} 388#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */ 389 390#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) 391/* 392 * Deterministic signature wrapper 393 * 394 * note: The f_rng_blind parameter must not be NULL. 395 * 396 */ 397int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_restartable(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, 398 mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s, 399 const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, 400 mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, 401 int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), 402 void *p_rng_blind, 403 mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx) 404{ 405 int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; 406 mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context rng_ctx; 407 mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *p_rng = &rng_ctx; 408 unsigned char data[2 * MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES]; 409 size_t grp_len = (grp->nbits + 7) / 8; 410 const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; 411 mbedtls_mpi h; 412 413 if ((md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg)) == NULL) { 414 return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; 415 } 416 417 mbedtls_mpi_init(&h); 418 mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init(&rng_ctx); 419 420 ECDSA_RS_ENTER(det); 421 422#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) 423 if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->det != NULL) { 424 /* redirect to our context */ 425 p_rng = &rs_ctx->det->rng_ctx; 426 427 /* jump to current step */ 428 if (rs_ctx->det->state == ecdsa_det_sign) { 429 goto sign; 430 } 431 } 432#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ 433 434 /* Use private key and message hash (reduced) to initialize HMAC_DRBG */ 435 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(d, data, grp_len)); 436 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(derive_mpi(grp, &h, buf, blen)); 437 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&h, data + grp_len, grp_len)); 438 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf(p_rng, md_info, data, 2 * grp_len)); 439 440#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) 441 if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->det != NULL) { 442 rs_ctx->det->state = ecdsa_det_sign; 443 } 444 445sign: 446#endif 447#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT) 448 (void) f_rng_blind; 449 (void) p_rng_blind; 450 ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_sign(grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, 451 mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng); 452#else 453 ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_restartable(grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, 454 mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng, 455 f_rng_blind, p_rng_blind, rs_ctx); 456#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */ 457 458cleanup: 459 mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free(&rng_ctx); 460 mbedtls_mpi_free(&h); 461 462 ECDSA_RS_LEAVE(det); 463 464 return ret; 465} 466 467/* 468 * Deterministic signature wrapper 469 */ 470int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, 471 mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d, 472 const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, 473 mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, 474 int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *, 475 size_t), 476 void *p_rng_blind) 477{ 478 return mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_restartable(grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, md_alg, 479 f_rng_blind, p_rng_blind, NULL); 480} 481#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */ 482 483#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT) 484/* 485 * Verify ECDSA signature of hashed message (SEC1 4.1.4) 486 * Obviously, compared to SEC1 4.1.3, we skip step 2 (hash message) 487 */ 488int mbedtls_ecdsa_verify_restartable(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, 489 const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, 490 const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, 491 const mbedtls_mpi *r, 492 const mbedtls_mpi *s, 493 mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx) 494{ 495 int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; 496 mbedtls_mpi e, s_inv, u1, u2; 497 mbedtls_ecp_point R; 498 mbedtls_mpi *pu1 = &u1, *pu2 = &u2; 499 500 mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&R); 501 mbedtls_mpi_init(&e); mbedtls_mpi_init(&s_inv); 502 mbedtls_mpi_init(&u1); mbedtls_mpi_init(&u2); 503 504 /* Fail cleanly on curves such as Curve25519 that can't be used for ECDSA */ 505 if (!mbedtls_ecdsa_can_do(grp->id) || grp->N.p == NULL) { 506 return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; 507 } 508 509 ECDSA_RS_ENTER(ver); 510 511#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) 512 if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->ver != NULL) { 513 /* redirect to our context */ 514 pu1 = &rs_ctx->ver->u1; 515 pu2 = &rs_ctx->ver->u2; 516 517 /* jump to current step */ 518 if (rs_ctx->ver->state == ecdsa_ver_muladd) { 519 goto muladd; 520 } 521 } 522#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ 523 524 /* 525 * Step 1: make sure r and s are in range 1..n-1 526 */ 527 if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(r, 1) < 0 || mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(r, &grp->N) >= 0 || 528 mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(s, 1) < 0 || mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(s, &grp->N) >= 0) { 529 ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED; 530 goto cleanup; 531 } 532 533 /* 534 * Step 3: derive MPI from hashed message 535 */ 536 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(derive_mpi(grp, &e, buf, blen)); 537 538 /* 539 * Step 4: u1 = e / s mod n, u2 = r / s mod n 540 */ 541 ECDSA_BUDGET(MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_CHK + MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_INV + 2); 542 543 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod(&s_inv, s, &grp->N)); 544 545 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(pu1, &e, &s_inv)); 546 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(pu1, pu1, &grp->N)); 547 548 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(pu2, r, &s_inv)); 549 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(pu2, pu2, &grp->N)); 550 551#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) 552 if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->ver != NULL) { 553 rs_ctx->ver->state = ecdsa_ver_muladd; 554 } 555 556muladd: 557#endif 558 /* 559 * Step 5: R = u1 G + u2 Q 560 */ 561 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_muladd_restartable(grp, 562 &R, pu1, &grp->G, pu2, Q, ECDSA_RS_ECP)); 563 564 if (mbedtls_ecp_is_zero(&R)) { 565 ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED; 566 goto cleanup; 567 } 568 569 /* 570 * Step 6: convert xR to an integer (no-op) 571 * Step 7: reduce xR mod n (gives v) 572 */ 573 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&R.X, &R.X, &grp->N)); 574 575 /* 576 * Step 8: check if v (that is, R.X) is equal to r 577 */ 578 if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&R.X, r) != 0) { 579 ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED; 580 goto cleanup; 581 } 582 583cleanup: 584 mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&R); 585 mbedtls_mpi_free(&e); mbedtls_mpi_free(&s_inv); 586 mbedtls_mpi_free(&u1); mbedtls_mpi_free(&u2); 587 588 ECDSA_RS_LEAVE(ver); 589 590 return ret; 591} 592 593/* 594 * Verify ECDSA signature of hashed message 595 */ 596int mbedtls_ecdsa_verify(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, 597 const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, 598 const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, 599 const mbedtls_mpi *r, 600 const mbedtls_mpi *s) 601{ 602 return mbedtls_ecdsa_verify_restartable(grp, buf, blen, Q, r, s, NULL); 603} 604#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT */ 605 606/* 607 * Convert a signature (given by context) to ASN.1 608 */ 609static int ecdsa_signature_to_asn1(const mbedtls_mpi *r, const mbedtls_mpi *s, 610 unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, 611 size_t *slen) 612{ 613 int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; 614 unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN] = { 0 }; 615 unsigned char *p = buf + sizeof(buf); 616 size_t len = 0; 617 618 MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(&p, buf, s)); 619 MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(&p, buf, r)); 620 621 MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&p, buf, len)); 622 MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&p, buf, 623 MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 624 MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); 625 626 if (len > sig_size) { 627 return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; 628 } 629 630 memcpy(sig, p, len); 631 *slen = len; 632 633 return 0; 634} 635 636/* 637 * Compute and write signature 638 */ 639int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_restartable(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, 640 mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, 641 const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, 642 unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *slen, 643 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), 644 void *p_rng, 645 mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx) 646{ 647 int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; 648 mbedtls_mpi r, s; 649 if (f_rng == NULL) { 650 return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; 651 } 652 653 mbedtls_mpi_init(&r); 654 mbedtls_mpi_init(&s); 655 656#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) 657 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_restartable(&ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d, 658 hash, hlen, md_alg, f_rng, 659 p_rng, rs_ctx)); 660#else 661 (void) md_alg; 662 663#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT) 664 (void) rs_ctx; 665 666 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecdsa_sign(&ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d, 667 hash, hlen, f_rng, p_rng)); 668#else 669 /* Use the same RNG for both blinding and ephemeral key generation */ 670 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_restartable(&ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d, 671 hash, hlen, f_rng, p_rng, f_rng, 672 p_rng, rs_ctx)); 673#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */ 674#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */ 675 676 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecdsa_signature_to_asn1(&r, &s, sig, sig_size, slen)); 677 678cleanup: 679 mbedtls_mpi_free(&r); 680 mbedtls_mpi_free(&s); 681 682 return ret; 683} 684 685/* 686 * Compute and write signature 687 */ 688int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, 689 mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, 690 const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, 691 unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *slen, 692 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), 693 void *p_rng) 694{ 695 return mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_restartable( 696 ctx, md_alg, hash, hlen, sig, sig_size, slen, 697 f_rng, p_rng, NULL); 698} 699 700/* 701 * Read and check signature 702 */ 703int mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, 704 const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, 705 const unsigned char *sig, size_t slen) 706{ 707 return mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature_restartable( 708 ctx, hash, hlen, sig, slen, NULL); 709} 710 711/* 712 * Restartable read and check signature 713 */ 714int mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature_restartable(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, 715 const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, 716 const unsigned char *sig, size_t slen, 717 mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx) 718{ 719 int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; 720 unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *) sig; 721 const unsigned char *end = sig + slen; 722 size_t len; 723 mbedtls_mpi r, s; 724 mbedtls_mpi_init(&r); 725 mbedtls_mpi_init(&s); 726 727 if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, 728 MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { 729 ret += MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; 730 goto cleanup; 731 } 732 733 if (p + len != end) { 734 ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, 735 MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 736 goto cleanup; 737 } 738 739 if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi(&p, end, &r)) != 0 || 740 (ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi(&p, end, &s)) != 0) { 741 ret += MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; 742 goto cleanup; 743 } 744#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT) 745 (void) rs_ctx; 746 747 if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_verify(&ctx->grp, hash, hlen, 748 &ctx->Q, &r, &s)) != 0) { 749 goto cleanup; 750 } 751#else 752 if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_verify_restartable(&ctx->grp, hash, hlen, 753 &ctx->Q, &r, &s, rs_ctx)) != 0) { 754 goto cleanup; 755 } 756#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT */ 757 758 /* At this point we know that the buffer starts with a valid signature. 759 * Return 0 if the buffer just contains the signature, and a specific 760 * error code if the valid signature is followed by more data. */ 761 if (p != end) { 762 ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH; 763 } 764 765cleanup: 766 mbedtls_mpi_free(&r); 767 mbedtls_mpi_free(&s); 768 769 return ret; 770} 771 772#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT) 773/* 774 * Generate key pair 775 */ 776int mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid, 777 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) 778{ 779 int ret = 0; 780 ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&ctx->grp, gid); 781 if (ret != 0) { 782 return ret; 783 } 784 785 return mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair(&ctx->grp, &ctx->d, 786 &ctx->Q, f_rng, p_rng); 787} 788#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT */ 789 790/* 791 * Set context from an mbedtls_ecp_keypair 792 */ 793int mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key) 794{ 795 int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; 796 if ((ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_copy(&ctx->grp, &key->grp)) != 0 || 797 (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx->d, &key->d)) != 0 || 798 (ret = mbedtls_ecp_copy(&ctx->Q, &key->Q)) != 0) { 799 mbedtls_ecdsa_free(ctx); 800 } 801 802 return ret; 803} 804 805/* 806 * Initialize context 807 */ 808void mbedtls_ecdsa_init(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx) 809{ 810 mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(ctx); 811} 812 813/* 814 * Free context 815 */ 816void mbedtls_ecdsa_free(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx) 817{ 818 if (ctx == NULL) { 819 return; 820 } 821 822 mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(ctx); 823} 824 825#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) 826/* 827 * Initialize a restart context 828 */ 829void mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_init(mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *ctx) 830{ 831 mbedtls_ecp_restart_init(&ctx->ecp); 832 833 ctx->ver = NULL; 834 ctx->sig = NULL; 835#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) 836 ctx->det = NULL; 837#endif 838} 839 840/* 841 * Free the components of a restart context 842 */ 843void mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_free(mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *ctx) 844{ 845 if (ctx == NULL) { 846 return; 847 } 848 849 mbedtls_ecp_restart_free(&ctx->ecp); 850 851 ecdsa_restart_ver_free(ctx->ver); 852 mbedtls_free(ctx->ver); 853 ctx->ver = NULL; 854 855 ecdsa_restart_sig_free(ctx->sig); 856 mbedtls_free(ctx->sig); 857 ctx->sig = NULL; 858 859#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) 860 ecdsa_restart_det_free(ctx->det); 861 mbedtls_free(ctx->det); 862 ctx->det = NULL; 863#endif 864} 865#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ 866 867#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ 868