1// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 2/* 3 * fs/verity/verify.c: data verification functions, i.e. hooks for ->readpages() 4 * 5 * Copyright 2019 Google LLC 6 */ 7 8#include "fsverity_private.h" 9 10#include <crypto/hash.h> 11#include <linux/bio.h> 12#include <linux/ratelimit.h> 13 14static struct workqueue_struct *fsverity_read_workqueue; 15 16/** 17 * hash_at_level() - compute the location of the block's hash at the given level 18 * 19 * @params: (in) the Merkle tree parameters 20 * @dindex: (in) the index of the data block being verified 21 * @level: (in) the level of hash we want (0 is leaf level) 22 * @hindex: (out) the index of the hash block containing the wanted hash 23 * @hoffset: (out) the byte offset to the wanted hash within the hash block 24 */ 25static void hash_at_level(const struct merkle_tree_params *params, 26 pgoff_t dindex, unsigned int level, pgoff_t *hindex, 27 unsigned int *hoffset) 28{ 29 pgoff_t position; 30 31 /* Offset of the hash within the level's region, in hashes */ 32 position = dindex >> (level * params->log_arity); 33 34 /* Index of the hash block in the tree overall */ 35 *hindex = params->level_start[level] + (position >> params->log_arity); 36 37 /* Offset of the wanted hash (in bytes) within the hash block */ 38 *hoffset = (position & ((1 << params->log_arity) - 1)) << 39 (params->log_blocksize - params->log_arity); 40} 41 42/* Extract a hash from a hash page */ 43static void extract_hash(struct page *hpage, unsigned int hoffset, 44 unsigned int hsize, u8 *out) 45{ 46 void *virt = kmap_atomic(hpage); 47 48 memcpy(out, virt + hoffset, hsize); 49 kunmap_atomic(virt); 50} 51 52static inline int cmp_hashes(const struct fsverity_info *vi, 53 const u8 *want_hash, const u8 *real_hash, 54 pgoff_t index, int level) 55{ 56 const unsigned int hsize = vi->tree_params.digest_size; 57 58 if (memcmp(want_hash, real_hash, hsize) == 0) 59 return 0; 60 61 fsverity_err(vi->inode, 62 "FILE CORRUPTED! index=%lu, level=%d, want_hash=%s:%*phN, real_hash=%s:%*phN", 63 index, level, 64 vi->tree_params.hash_alg->name, hsize, want_hash, 65 vi->tree_params.hash_alg->name, hsize, real_hash); 66 return -EBADMSG; 67} 68 69/* 70 * Verify a single data page against the file's Merkle tree. 71 * 72 * In principle, we need to verify the entire path to the root node. However, 73 * for efficiency the filesystem may cache the hash pages. Therefore we need 74 * only ascend the tree until an already-verified page is seen, as indicated by 75 * the PageChecked bit being set; then verify the path to that page. 76 * 77 * This code currently only supports the case where the verity block size is 78 * equal to PAGE_SIZE. Doing otherwise would be possible but tricky, since we 79 * wouldn't be able to use the PageChecked bit. 80 * 81 * Note that multiple processes may race to verify a hash page and mark it 82 * Checked, but it doesn't matter; the result will be the same either way. 83 * 84 * Return: true if the page is valid, else false. 85 */ 86static bool verify_page(struct inode *inode, const struct fsverity_info *vi, 87 struct ahash_request *req, struct page *data_page, 88 unsigned long level0_ra_pages) 89{ 90 const struct merkle_tree_params *params = &vi->tree_params; 91 const unsigned int hsize = params->digest_size; 92 const pgoff_t index = data_page->index; 93 int level; 94 u8 _want_hash[FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; 95 const u8 *want_hash; 96 u8 real_hash[FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; 97 struct page *hpages[FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS]; 98 unsigned int hoffsets[FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS]; 99 int err; 100 101 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!PageLocked(data_page) || PageUptodate(data_page))) 102 return false; 103 104 pr_debug_ratelimited("Verifying data page %lu...\n", index); 105 106#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_CODE_SIGN 107 if (index >= DIV_ROUND_UP(vi->verified_data_size, PAGE_SIZE)) { 108 pr_debug_ratelimited("Data out of verity range %lu\n", 109 vi->verified_data_size >> PAGE_SHIFT); 110 return true; 111 } 112#endif 113 /* 114 * Starting at the leaf level, ascend the tree saving hash pages along 115 * the way until we find a verified hash page, indicated by PageChecked; 116 * or until we reach the root. 117 */ 118 for (level = 0; level < params->num_levels; level++) { 119 pgoff_t hindex; 120 unsigned int hoffset; 121 struct page *hpage; 122 123 hash_at_level(params, index, level, &hindex, &hoffset); 124 125 pr_debug_ratelimited("Level %d: hindex=%lu, hoffset=%u\n", 126 level, hindex, hoffset); 127 128 hpage = inode->i_sb->s_vop->read_merkle_tree_page(inode, hindex, 129 level == 0 ? level0_ra_pages : 0); 130 if (IS_ERR(hpage)) { 131 err = PTR_ERR(hpage); 132 fsverity_err(inode, 133 "Error %d reading Merkle tree page %lu", 134 err, hindex); 135 goto out; 136 } 137 138 if (PageChecked(hpage)) { 139 extract_hash(hpage, hoffset, hsize, _want_hash); 140 want_hash = _want_hash; 141 put_page(hpage); 142 pr_debug_ratelimited("Hash page already checked, want %s:%*phN\n", 143 params->hash_alg->name, 144 hsize, want_hash); 145 goto descend; 146 } 147 pr_debug_ratelimited("Hash page not yet checked\n"); 148 hpages[level] = hpage; 149 hoffsets[level] = hoffset; 150 } 151 152 want_hash = vi->root_hash; 153 pr_debug("Want root hash: %s:%*phN\n", 154 params->hash_alg->name, hsize, want_hash); 155descend: 156 /* Descend the tree verifying hash pages */ 157 for (; level > 0; level--) { 158 struct page *hpage = hpages[level - 1]; 159 unsigned int hoffset = hoffsets[level - 1]; 160 161 err = fsverity_hash_page(params, inode, req, hpage, real_hash); 162 if (err) 163 goto out; 164 err = cmp_hashes(vi, want_hash, real_hash, index, level - 1); 165 if (err) 166 goto out; 167 SetPageChecked(hpage); 168 extract_hash(hpage, hoffset, hsize, _want_hash); 169 want_hash = _want_hash; 170 put_page(hpage); 171 pr_debug("Verified hash page at level %d, now want %s:%*phN\n", 172 level - 1, params->hash_alg->name, hsize, want_hash); 173 } 174 175 /* Finally, verify the data page */ 176 err = fsverity_hash_page(params, inode, req, data_page, real_hash); 177 if (err) 178 goto out; 179 err = cmp_hashes(vi, want_hash, real_hash, index, -1); 180out: 181 for (; level > 0; level--) 182 put_page(hpages[level - 1]); 183 184 return err == 0; 185} 186 187/** 188 * fsverity_verify_page() - verify a data page 189 * @page: the page to verity 190 * 191 * Verify a page that has just been read from a verity file. The page must be a 192 * pagecache page that is still locked and not yet uptodate. 193 * 194 * Return: true if the page is valid, else false. 195 */ 196bool fsverity_verify_page(struct page *page) 197{ 198 struct inode *inode = page->mapping->host; 199 const struct fsverity_info *vi = inode->i_verity_info; 200 struct ahash_request *req; 201 bool valid; 202 203 /* This allocation never fails, since it's mempool-backed. */ 204 req = fsverity_alloc_hash_request(vi->tree_params.hash_alg, GFP_NOFS); 205 206 valid = verify_page(inode, vi, req, page, 0); 207 208 fsverity_free_hash_request(vi->tree_params.hash_alg, req); 209 210 return valid; 211} 212EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fsverity_verify_page); 213 214#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK 215/** 216 * fsverity_verify_bio() - verify a 'read' bio that has just completed 217 * @bio: the bio to verify 218 * 219 * Verify a set of pages that have just been read from a verity file. The pages 220 * must be pagecache pages that are still locked and not yet uptodate. Pages 221 * that fail verification are set to the Error state. Verification is skipped 222 * for pages already in the Error state, e.g. due to fscrypt decryption failure. 223 * 224 * This is a helper function for use by the ->readpages() method of filesystems 225 * that issue bios to read data directly into the page cache. Filesystems that 226 * populate the page cache without issuing bios (e.g. non block-based 227 * filesystems) must instead call fsverity_verify_page() directly on each page. 228 * All filesystems must also call fsverity_verify_page() on holes. 229 */ 230void fsverity_verify_bio(struct bio *bio) 231{ 232 struct inode *inode = bio_first_page_all(bio)->mapping->host; 233 const struct fsverity_info *vi = inode->i_verity_info; 234 const struct merkle_tree_params *params = &vi->tree_params; 235 struct ahash_request *req; 236 struct bio_vec *bv; 237 struct bvec_iter_all iter_all; 238 unsigned long max_ra_pages = 0; 239 240 /* This allocation never fails, since it's mempool-backed. */ 241 req = fsverity_alloc_hash_request(params->hash_alg, GFP_NOFS); 242 243 if (bio->bi_opf & REQ_RAHEAD) { 244 /* 245 * If this bio is for data readahead, then we also do readahead 246 * of the first (largest) level of the Merkle tree. Namely, 247 * when a Merkle tree page is read, we also try to piggy-back on 248 * some additional pages -- up to 1/4 the number of data pages. 249 * 250 * This improves sequential read performance, as it greatly 251 * reduces the number of I/O requests made to the Merkle tree. 252 */ 253 bio_for_each_segment_all(bv, bio, iter_all) 254 max_ra_pages++; 255 max_ra_pages /= 4; 256 } 257 258 bio_for_each_segment_all(bv, bio, iter_all) { 259 struct page *page = bv->bv_page; 260 unsigned long level0_index = page->index >> params->log_arity; 261 unsigned long level0_ra_pages = 262 min(max_ra_pages, params->level0_blocks - level0_index); 263 264 if (!PageError(page) && 265 !verify_page(inode, vi, req, page, level0_ra_pages)) 266 SetPageError(page); 267 } 268 269 fsverity_free_hash_request(params->hash_alg, req); 270} 271EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fsverity_verify_bio); 272#endif /* CONFIG_BLOCK */ 273 274 275/** 276 * fsverity_get_verified_data_size() - get verified data size of a verity file 277 * @inode: the file's inode 278 * 279 * Return: verified data size 280 */ 281u64 fsverity_get_verified_data_size(const struct inode *inode) 282{ 283#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_CODE_SIGN 284 return fsverity_get_info(inode)->verified_data_size; 285#else 286 return inode->i_size; 287#endif 288} 289 290 291/** 292 * fsverity_enqueue_verify_work() - enqueue work on the fs-verity workqueue 293 * @work: the work to enqueue 294 * 295 * Enqueue verification work for asynchronous processing. 296 */ 297void fsverity_enqueue_verify_work(struct work_struct *work) 298{ 299 queue_work(fsverity_read_workqueue, work); 300} 301EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fsverity_enqueue_verify_work); 302 303int __init fsverity_init_workqueue(void) 304{ 305 /* 306 * Use a high-priority workqueue to prioritize verification work, which 307 * blocks reads from completing, over regular application tasks. 308 * 309 * For performance reasons, don't use an unbound workqueue. Using an 310 * unbound workqueue for crypto operations causes excessive scheduler 311 * latency on ARM64. 312 */ 313 fsverity_read_workqueue = alloc_workqueue("fsverity_read_queue", 314 WQ_HIGHPRI, 315 num_online_cpus()); 316 if (!fsverity_read_workqueue) 317 return -ENOMEM; 318 return 0; 319} 320 321void __init fsverity_exit_workqueue(void) 322{ 323 destroy_workqueue(fsverity_read_workqueue); 324 fsverity_read_workqueue = NULL; 325} 326