1/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ */ 2/* 3 * Copyright IBM Corp. 2001, 2006 4 * Author(s): Robert Burroughs 5 * Eric Rossman (edrossma@us.ibm.com) 6 * 7 * Hotplug & misc device support: Jochen Roehrig (roehrig@de.ibm.com) 8 * Major cleanup & driver split: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> 9 */ 10 11#ifndef _ZCRYPT_CCA_KEY_H_ 12#define _ZCRYPT_CCA_KEY_H_ 13 14struct T6_keyBlock_hdr { 15 unsigned short blen; 16 unsigned short ulen; 17 unsigned short flags; 18}; 19 20/** 21 * mapping for the cca private ME key token. 22 * Three parts of interest here: the header, the private section and 23 * the public section. 24 * 25 * mapping for the cca key token header 26 */ 27struct cca_token_hdr { 28 unsigned char token_identifier; 29 unsigned char version; 30 unsigned short token_length; 31 unsigned char reserved[4]; 32} __packed; 33 34#define CCA_TKN_HDR_ID_EXT 0x1E 35 36#define CCA_PVT_USAGE_ALL 0x80 37 38/** 39 * mapping for the cca public section 40 * In a private key, the modulus doesn't appear in the public 41 * section. So, an arbitrary public exponent of 0x010001 will be 42 * used, for a section length of 0x0F always. 43 */ 44struct cca_public_sec { 45 unsigned char section_identifier; 46 unsigned char version; 47 unsigned short section_length; 48 unsigned char reserved[2]; 49 unsigned short exponent_len; 50 unsigned short modulus_bit_len; 51 unsigned short modulus_byte_len; /* In a private key, this is 0 */ 52} __packed; 53 54/** 55 * mapping for the cca private CRT key 'token' 56 * The first three parts (the only parts considered in this release) 57 * are: the header, the private section and the public section. 58 * The header and public section are the same as for the 59 * struct cca_private_ext_ME 60 * 61 * Following the structure are the quantities p, q, dp, dq, u, pad, 62 * and modulus, in that order, where pad_len is the modulo 8 63 * complement of the residue modulo 8 of the sum of 64 * (p_len + q_len + dp_len + dq_len + u_len). 65 */ 66struct cca_pvt_ext_CRT_sec { 67 unsigned char section_identifier; 68 unsigned char version; 69 unsigned short section_length; 70 unsigned char private_key_hash[20]; 71 unsigned char reserved1[4]; 72 unsigned char key_format; 73 unsigned char reserved2; 74 unsigned char key_name_hash[20]; 75 unsigned char key_use_flags[4]; 76 unsigned short p_len; 77 unsigned short q_len; 78 unsigned short dp_len; 79 unsigned short dq_len; 80 unsigned short u_len; 81 unsigned short mod_len; 82 unsigned char reserved3[4]; 83 unsigned short pad_len; 84 unsigned char reserved4[52]; 85 unsigned char confounder[8]; 86} __packed; 87 88#define CCA_PVT_EXT_CRT_SEC_ID_PVT 0x08 89#define CCA_PVT_EXT_CRT_SEC_FMT_CL 0x40 90 91/** 92 * Set up private key fields of a type6 MEX message. The _pad variant 93 * strips leading zeroes from the b_key. 94 * Note that all numerics in the key token are big-endian, 95 * while the entries in the key block header are little-endian. 96 * 97 * @mex: pointer to user input data 98 * @p: pointer to memory area for the key 99 * 100 * Returns the size of the key area or negative errno value. 101 */ 102static inline int zcrypt_type6_mex_key_en(struct ica_rsa_modexpo *mex, void *p) 103{ 104 static struct cca_token_hdr static_pub_hdr = { 105 .token_identifier = 0x1E, 106 }; 107 static struct cca_public_sec static_pub_sec = { 108 .section_identifier = 0x04, 109 }; 110 struct { 111 struct T6_keyBlock_hdr t6_hdr; 112 struct cca_token_hdr pubHdr; 113 struct cca_public_sec pubSec; 114 char exponent[0]; 115 } __packed *key = p; 116 unsigned char *temp; 117 int i; 118 119 /* 120 * The inputdatalength was a selection criteria in the dispatching 121 * function zcrypt_rsa_modexpo(). However, do a plausibility check 122 * here to make sure the following copy_from_user() can't be utilized 123 * to compromise the system. 124 */ 125 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(mex->inputdatalength > 512)) 126 return -EINVAL; 127 128 memset(key, 0, sizeof(*key)); 129 130 key->pubHdr = static_pub_hdr; 131 key->pubSec = static_pub_sec; 132 133 /* key parameter block */ 134 temp = key->exponent; 135 if (copy_from_user(temp, mex->b_key, mex->inputdatalength)) 136 return -EFAULT; 137 /* Strip leading zeroes from b_key. */ 138 for (i = 0; i < mex->inputdatalength; i++) 139 if (temp[i]) 140 break; 141 if (i >= mex->inputdatalength) 142 return -EINVAL; 143 memmove(temp, temp + i, mex->inputdatalength - i); 144 temp += mex->inputdatalength - i; 145 /* modulus */ 146 if (copy_from_user(temp, mex->n_modulus, mex->inputdatalength)) 147 return -EFAULT; 148 149 key->pubSec.modulus_bit_len = 8 * mex->inputdatalength; 150 key->pubSec.modulus_byte_len = mex->inputdatalength; 151 key->pubSec.exponent_len = mex->inputdatalength - i; 152 key->pubSec.section_length = sizeof(key->pubSec) + 153 2*mex->inputdatalength - i; 154 key->pubHdr.token_length = 155 key->pubSec.section_length + sizeof(key->pubHdr); 156 key->t6_hdr.ulen = key->pubHdr.token_length + 4; 157 key->t6_hdr.blen = key->pubHdr.token_length + 6; 158 return sizeof(*key) + 2*mex->inputdatalength - i; 159} 160 161/** 162 * Set up private key fields of a type6 CRT message. 163 * Note that all numerics in the key token are big-endian, 164 * while the entries in the key block header are little-endian. 165 * 166 * @mex: pointer to user input data 167 * @p: pointer to memory area for the key 168 * 169 * Returns the size of the key area or -EFAULT 170 */ 171static inline int zcrypt_type6_crt_key(struct ica_rsa_modexpo_crt *crt, void *p) 172{ 173 static struct cca_public_sec static_cca_pub_sec = { 174 .section_identifier = 4, 175 .section_length = 0x000f, 176 .exponent_len = 0x0003, 177 }; 178 static char pk_exponent[3] = { 0x01, 0x00, 0x01 }; 179 struct { 180 struct T6_keyBlock_hdr t6_hdr; 181 struct cca_token_hdr token; 182 struct cca_pvt_ext_CRT_sec pvt; 183 char key_parts[0]; 184 } __packed *key = p; 185 struct cca_public_sec *pub; 186 int short_len, long_len, pad_len, key_len, size; 187 188 /* 189 * The inputdatalength was a selection criteria in the dispatching 190 * function zcrypt_rsa_crt(). However, do a plausibility check 191 * here to make sure the following copy_from_user() can't be utilized 192 * to compromise the system. 193 */ 194 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(crt->inputdatalength > 512)) 195 return -EINVAL; 196 197 memset(key, 0, sizeof(*key)); 198 199 short_len = (crt->inputdatalength + 1) / 2; 200 long_len = short_len + 8; 201 pad_len = -(3*long_len + 2*short_len) & 7; 202 key_len = 3*long_len + 2*short_len + pad_len + crt->inputdatalength; 203 size = sizeof(*key) + key_len + sizeof(*pub) + 3; 204 205 /* parameter block.key block */ 206 key->t6_hdr.blen = size; 207 key->t6_hdr.ulen = size - 2; 208 209 /* key token header */ 210 key->token.token_identifier = CCA_TKN_HDR_ID_EXT; 211 key->token.token_length = size - 6; 212 213 /* private section */ 214 key->pvt.section_identifier = CCA_PVT_EXT_CRT_SEC_ID_PVT; 215 key->pvt.section_length = sizeof(key->pvt) + key_len; 216 key->pvt.key_format = CCA_PVT_EXT_CRT_SEC_FMT_CL; 217 key->pvt.key_use_flags[0] = CCA_PVT_USAGE_ALL; 218 key->pvt.p_len = key->pvt.dp_len = key->pvt.u_len = long_len; 219 key->pvt.q_len = key->pvt.dq_len = short_len; 220 key->pvt.mod_len = crt->inputdatalength; 221 key->pvt.pad_len = pad_len; 222 223 /* key parts */ 224 if (copy_from_user(key->key_parts, crt->np_prime, long_len) || 225 copy_from_user(key->key_parts + long_len, 226 crt->nq_prime, short_len) || 227 copy_from_user(key->key_parts + long_len + short_len, 228 crt->bp_key, long_len) || 229 copy_from_user(key->key_parts + 2*long_len + short_len, 230 crt->bq_key, short_len) || 231 copy_from_user(key->key_parts + 2*long_len + 2*short_len, 232 crt->u_mult_inv, long_len)) 233 return -EFAULT; 234 memset(key->key_parts + 3*long_len + 2*short_len + pad_len, 235 0xff, crt->inputdatalength); 236 pub = (struct cca_public_sec *)(key->key_parts + key_len); 237 *pub = static_cca_pub_sec; 238 pub->modulus_bit_len = 8 * crt->inputdatalength; 239 /* 240 * In a private key, the modulus doesn't appear in the public 241 * section. So, an arbitrary public exponent of 0x010001 will be 242 * used. 243 */ 244 memcpy((char *) (pub + 1), pk_exponent, 3); 245 return size; 246} 247 248#endif /* _ZCRYPT_CCA_KEY_H_ */ 249