Lines Matching defs:session
581 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
582 s->session = NULL;
927 * we can "construct" a session to give us the desired check - i.e. to
928 * find if there's a session in the hash table that would conflict with
929 * any new session built out of this id/id_len and the ssl_version in use
1211 if (s->session != NULL) {
1213 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
1595 if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL))
1598 return s->session->peer;
1605 if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL))
1608 r = s->session->peer_chain;
2174 || ((s->session == NULL || s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0)
2433 if (!s->session || SSL_in_init(s) || ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s))
2435 if (s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)
2855 * In TLSv1.3 on the server SNI is not associated with the session
2870 return s->session->ext.hostname;
2879 * attempted and the session from the original handshake had a
2885 * - If the session from the original handshake had a servername accepted
2896 && s->session != NULL
2897 && s->session->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION)
2898 return s->session->ext.hostname;
2900 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hit && s->session->ext.hostname != NULL)
2901 return s->session->ext.hostname;
3158 if (s->session == NULL
3204 * session with a matching session ID.
3397 * session ticket, and the client will accordingly send us early data
3420 /* By default we send two session tickets automatically in TLSv1.3 */
3468 * Free internal session cache. However: the remove_cb() may reference
3471 * As the ex_data handling routines might also touch the session cache,
3741 * would be rather hard to do anyway :-). Also if the session has already
3744 if (s->session->session_id_length == 0 || s->session->not_resumable)
3749 * associated with this session, so when we try to resume it and
3751 * indication that this is actually a session for the proper application
3756 if (s->server && s->session->sid_ctx_length == 0
3764 * Add the session to the internal cache. In server side TLSv1.3 we
3766 * with only a dummy session id so there is no reason to cache it,
3771 * session timeout events
3781 SSL_CTX_add_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
3784 * Add the session to the external cache. We do this even in server side
3786 * know about the creation of a session and aren't doing a full cache.
3789 SSL_SESSION_up_ref(s->session);
3790 if (!s->session_ctx->new_session_cb(s, s->session))
3791 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
4086 * Otherwise, copy configuration state, and session if set.
4091 if (s->session != NULL) {
4093 * Arranges to share the same session via up_ref. This "copies"
4094 * session-id, SSL_METHOD, sid_ctx, and 'cert'
4100 * No session has been established yet, so we have to expect that
4230 if ((s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
4231 return s->session->cipher;
4365 * If the session ID context matches that of the parent SSL_CTX,
4520 size_t SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(const SSL_SESSION *session,
4524 return session->master_key_length;
4525 if (outlen > session->master_key_length)
4526 outlen = session->master_key_length;
4527 memcpy(out, session->master_key, outlen);
4624 if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL)
4626 return s->session->psk_identity_hint;
4631 if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL)
4633 return s->session->psk_identity;
5111 X509 *cert = s->session != NULL ? s->session->peer : NULL;
5229 X509 *cert = s->session != NULL ? s->session->peer : NULL;
5306 * With SSL_VERIFY_NONE the session may be cached and re-used despite a
5313 * session.
5820 if (ssl->session != NULL && USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(ssl->session))
5821 return GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(ssl->session);
5830 if (ssl->session != NULL && USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(ssl->session)
5831 && ssl->split_send_fragment > GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(ssl->session))
5832 return GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(ssl->session);