Lines Matching defs:session

641         SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
642 s->session = NULL;
991 * we can "construct" a session to give us the desired check - i.e. to
992 * find if there's a session in the hash table that would conflict with
993 * any new session built out of this id/id_len and the ssl_version in use
1275 if (s->session != NULL) {
1277 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
1677 if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL))
1680 return s->session->peer;
1687 if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL))
1690 r = s->session->peer_chain;
2274 || ((s->session == NULL || s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0)
2533 if (!s->session || SSL_in_init(s) || ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s))
2535 if (s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)
2955 * In TLSv1.3 on the server SNI is not associated with the session
2970 return s->session->ext.hostname;
2979 * attempted and the session from the original handshake had a
2985 * - If the session from the original handshake had a servername accepted
2996 && s->session != NULL
2997 && s->session->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION)
2998 return s->session->ext.hostname;
3000 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hit && s->session->ext.hostname != NULL)
3001 return s->session->ext.hostname;
3258 if (s->session == NULL
3304 * session with a matching session ID.
3497 * session ticket, and the client will accordingly send us early data
3520 /* By default we send two session tickets automatically in TLSv1.3 */
3568 * Free internal session cache. However: the remove_cb() may reference
3571 * As the ex_data handling routines might also touch the session cache,
3843 if (s->session->session_id_length == 0)
3848 * associated with this session, so when we try to resume it and
3850 * indication that this is actually a session for the proper application
3855 if (s->server && s->session->sid_ctx_length == 0
3863 * Add the session to the internal cache. In server side TLSv1.3 we
3865 * with only a dummy session id so there is no reason to cache it,
3870 * session timeout events
3880 SSL_CTX_add_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
3883 * Add the session to the external cache. We do this even in server side
3885 * know about the creation of a session and aren't doing a full cache.
3888 SSL_SESSION_up_ref(s->session);
3889 if (!s->session_ctx->new_session_cb(s, s->session))
3890 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
4205 * Otherwise, copy configuration state, and session if set.
4210 if (s->session != NULL) {
4212 * Arranges to share the same session via up_ref. This "copies"
4213 * session-id, SSL_METHOD, sid_ctx, and 'cert'
4219 * No session has been established yet, so we have to expect that
4349 if ((s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
4350 return s->session->cipher;
4484 * If the session ID context matches that of the parent SSL_CTX,
4639 size_t SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(const SSL_SESSION *session,
4643 return session->master_key_length;
4644 if (outlen > session->master_key_length)
4645 outlen = session->master_key_length;
4646 memcpy(out, session->master_key, outlen);
4743 if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL)
4745 return s->session->psk_identity_hint;
4750 if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL)
4752 return s->session->psk_identity;
5230 X509 *cert = s->session != NULL ? s->session->peer : NULL;
5348 X509 *cert = s->session != NULL ? s->session->peer : NULL;
5425 * With SSL_VERIFY_NONE the session may be cached and re-used despite a
5432 * session.
5936 if (ssl->session != NULL && USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(ssl->session))
5937 return GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(ssl->session);
5946 if (ssl->session != NULL && USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(ssl->session)
5947 && ssl->split_send_fragment > GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(ssl->session))
5948 return GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(ssl->session);